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Abstract The idea that observing an action triggers an
automatic and obligatory activation of an imitative action in
the motor system of the observer has recently been ques-
tioned by studies examining complementary actions.
Instead of a tendency for imitation, cooperative settings
may facilitate the execution of dissimilar actions, resulting
in a relative disadvantage for imitative actions. The present
study aimed at clarifying the contribution of associative
learning and interference of task representations to the
reversal of congruency eVects. To distinguish between the
two, an experiment was designed, in which we increased
the eVects of associative learning and minimized the eVects
of task interference. Participants completed a series of imi-
tation and complementary action runs, in which they con-
tinuously imitated or complemented the actions of a virtual
co-actor. Each run was alternated with a test run showing
the same actions but including color-cues, and the partici-
pants were instructed to respond to color instead of the
actor’s posture. Reaction times to test runs showed no
reversal of facilitation eVects between the imitation and
complementary action conditions. This result strongly
argues that associative learning cannot adequately account
for reversed facilitation eVects. Our study provides addi-
tional support for action–perception models that allow Xex-
ible selection of action–perception coupling and challenges
the existing models purely based on stimulus–response
associations.
A remarkable amount of empirical evidence has been
reported in the literature so far suggesting a close relation
between action observation and action execution. DiVerent
studies show for instance that observing actions of other
people stimulates motor areas in the observer’s brain (see
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001 for review). How
exactly action observation and action execution relate to
each other is still not fully understood. The dominant view
in the literature is that observing an action triggers an auto-
matic and obligatory activation of an imitative action in the
motor system of the observer (e.g., Fadiga, Craighero, &
Olivier, 2005). According to this view, activated motor rep-
resentations map directly onto the observed actions, and a
successful execution of an action that is diVerent from the
one observed would require inhibition of the automatic ten-
dency for imitation (e.g., Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon,
2001a).
Recently, however, this direct and rigid view of action–
perception coupling has been challenged by studies exam-
ining complementary actions. The basic idea is that,
although imitation might be obligatorily introduced by
action observation in some conditions, and although it
might be beneWcial for social development of individuals
(e.g., Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001), an
automatic tendency to imitate may actually impede suc-
cessful cooperation between individuals. When working
together, like for instance in joint action tasks, co-actors
would mostly be producing complementary or opposite
actions rather then imitating each other in order to complete
a task successfully and reach the joint goal (Sebanz, Bek-
kering, & Knoblich, 2006). It seems that, in complex social
situations, action coordination relies more strongly on
actions complementary to the actions of others than on imi-
tative actions (Newman-Norlund, van Schie, van Zuijlen, &
Bekkering, 2007; Shibata, Suzuki, & Gyoba, 2007).
Emphasizing the role of complementary actions in
action–perception domain, Graf, Schütz-Bosbach, and
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Prinz (2009) have just recently suggested that complemen-
tary actions have a great functional importance for human
interactions. Understanding social interactions might ben-
eWt more from representations of complementary actions
than previously believed. For instance, being able to predict
someone’s action more precisely by watching the actions of
another person involved in the same interaction might just
make a diVerence between success and failure of that social
interaction. Neri, Luu, and Levi (2006) have shown that
visual discrimination of a human agent, presented as a
masked point-light display, is inXuenced by the presence of
a second agent. Namely, visual detection performance was
better when the two agents were acting in a meaningful
synchronized sequence, even though the temporal aspect of
the stimuli was actually irrelevant for successful task exe-
cution. Neri et al. suggested that human implicit knowledge
about the relations of actions between interacting agents
generates the synchronicity eVect observed in their study.
Additional evidence for the role of representations of
complementary actions in human interactions was recently
provided by van Schie, van Waterschoot, and Bekkering
(2008). The authors demonstrated a reversal of automatic
imitation eVect when executing actions in a cooperative set-
ting, suggesting a Xexible action–perception coupling pos-
sibly inXuenced by task representations. In their study,
participants either imitated (task A) or complemented (task
B) a virtual co-actor’s grasp on a manipulandum. In both
tasks, in 40% of all trials, a color-cue was presented, requir-
ing the execution of a predeWned grasp independently of the
observed action of the virtual actor. Responses in these
color (test) trials were compared between congruent (same)
and incongruent (opposite) actions of the participant and
the co-actor to determine automatic response activation in
this cooperative setting. They report that responses in con-
gruent trials were faster than in incongruent trials when
these colored trials were presented in the context of the imi-
tation task, indicating a congruency eVect. This eVect, how-
ever, completely reversed in the color trials presented in the
complementary-action task. The reversal of congruency
eVects suggests that the cognitive system is able to circum-
vent the automatic tendency to copy directly actions or pos-
tures of others and to Xexibly set task-goal appropriate
stimulus–response (S–R) associations to optimize perfor-
mance.
Van Schie et al. (2008) clearly demonstrate that the map-
ping between action observation and action execution is not
obligatory or automatic but may reXect the nature of the
task goal (e.g., imitation or complementary action). It
seems again that the coupling between action and percep-
tion is more Xexible than typically assumed in the imitation
literature. Yet, the exact nature of this Xexible action–
perception coupling needs further speciWcation. A possible
explanation is that prolonged practice of speciWc S–R
associations determines the way the congruency eVect
behaves. According to the associative sequence learning
(ASL) theory (Heyes, 2001), the cortical connections medi-
ating motor activation through action observation arise pri-
marily through correlated experience of observing and
executing the same actions. In other words, the beneWt
observed in congruent trials arises due to a lifetime of cor-
related experience between executed actions and perceptual
consequences. Consistent with this view, Heyes, Bird,
Johnson, and Haggard (2005) showed that practicing incon-
gruent associations modulates automatic imitation. SpeciW-
cally, the imitation eVect was abolished after incompatible
training. Furthermore, Catmur, Walsh, and Heyes (2007)
demonstrated that training participants to perform a diVer-
ent action than the one observed reversed the imitation
eVect. Catmur et al. suggest that both imitation eVect and its
reversal are based on sensorimotor learning through social
interactions with others. Both Heyes et al. and Catmur et al.
demonstrate that associative learning could account for
automatic imitation (through previously established S–R
associations) as well as for its context dependent abolition
or reversal (through recently established S–R association).
It seems thus possible that the reversal of the congruency
eVect as reported by van Schie et al. was caused by
associative learning. The study included a considerable
amount of trials (120), in which participants executed and
trained the complementary action task. In this way, these
new S–R associations established in the complementary
context might have caused the reversal of the congruency
eVect.
Although not denying the possible inXuences of learned
S–R associations and experience (ASL), van Schie et al.
(2008) argued for an approach less dependent on associa-
tive learning and more related to the goal level of tasks. The
idea they put forward is that the successful reversal of con-
gruency eVect might be due to task interference eVects aris-
ing in paradigms involving diVerent tasks, one of which
van Schie et al. applied in their study. Previous research
using task-switching paradigms, in which Xexible respond-
ing to stimulus features is required according to task-
speciWc S–R mappings, has stressed the importance of the
task history and the interference that might arise between
the competing tasks (e.g., Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994).
Interference may occur both at the level of task representa-
tions and at the level of speciWc stimuli (e.g., Koch &
Allport, 2006; Koch, Prinz, & Allport, 2005; Waszak,
Hommel, & Allport, 2003, 2004, 2005; Wylie & Allport,
2000). For instance, Koch and Allport demonstrated stimu-
lus-based priming of tasks in a task-switching paradigm.
Their study showed that the imperative stimuli themselves
could act as task cues and activate speciWc task representa-
tions reXecting the previous task context in which these
stimuli occurred. It is thus well possible that, in the study of
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van Schie et al., task-speciWc representations were activated
when stimuli that were needed for the primary task (i.e.,
imitation or complementary action) were included in a sec-
ondary task (i.e. responding to the color of the same stim-
uli). In this way, the imitation task may have facilitated the
processing of congruent actions in intermixed test trials,
whereas the same stimuli speeded up the selection of incon-
gruent actions in the context of a complementary-action
task.
The current study investigated in more detail the two
possible theoretical explanations for the reported reversed
congruency eVects. We based our study on the study con-
ducted by van Schie et al. (2008) and aimed at clarifying
the contribution of exhaustive training of stimulus–
response (S–R) mappings on the one hand and the contribu-
tion of task representation inXuences on the other to the
reversal of congruency eVects. To distinguish between
the two, an experiment was designed, in which we
(a) increased associative learning eVects and (b) minimized
task interference eVects between the primary and the sec-
ondary task. As a result, Wnding a reversed congruency
eVect would only be possible to explain in terms of associa-
tive learning. On the other hand, a failure to replicate the
reversal in congruency between the two conditions (imita-
tion and complementary action) would point toward the
implication of task-interference in the original study.
We increased associative learning simply by increasing
the number of trials of the primary task in which the partic-
ipants executed and trained the speciWc S–R associations.
While van Schie et al. (2008) used 120 trials, we included
192 trials for imitation and complementary action each.
Interference between the primary and the secondary task,
on the other hand, was minimized by dividing test (color)
trials and normal (imitation and complementary action) tri-
als in separate runs. Just recently, Dreisbach and Haider
(2008, 2009) have shown that specifying task representa-
tions, that is, the task rule that connects the stimuli on a
more global level, allows for focusing of attention on task
relevant stimulus features and prevents other possibly inter-
fering stimulus features from being processed. In order to
further maximize separation between task blocks, the task
rules were explicitly introduced on screen before each run
and the participants were instructed to actively prepare the
upcoming task.
Our analysis focused on the test trials, comparing the
congruent (executed action is the same as the observed
action) and the incongruent (executed action is opposite to
the observed action) trials in the imitation task context and
the complementary-action task context. If action–percep-
tion coupling is sensitive to the activation of multiple inter-
fering task rules that need to be kept online, separating the
two tasks in diVerent blocks should lead to a disappearance
of reversed congruency eVects. If, however, extensive train-
ing of speciWc S–R associations is the main determinant of
action–perception coupling, we should Wnd a similar rever-
sal of the congruency eVect as in van Schie et al. (2008).
Method
Participants
Twenty participants, 15 women and 5 men, were all under-
graduate students from Radboud University Nijmegen.
Their ages ranged between 18 and 28 years, with a mean
age of 21.4 years. Two participants were left-handed, and
the remaining 18 were right-handed. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and tasks
We used the exact same stimuli as van Schie et al. (2008),
which were images presented on a computer screen depict-
ing a virtual co-actor and a manipulandum. The images
were presented in pairs, with the Wrst image depicting the
co-actor in a non-active posture followed by the second
image showing the co-actor grasping the manipulandum,
using either a full grip or a precision grip (see Fig. 1). Par-
ticipants were instructed to either imitate (task 1) or to com-
plement (task 2) the grasping behavior of the co-actor. In
test trials, the manipulandum in the image was presented in
a deviant (green or purple) color. The participants were
instructed to respond to the color in these trials irrespective
of the behavior displayed by the virtual actor. The two col-
ors were used as cues for a preinstructed grasping action,
which was either full grip or precision grip depending on
the instruction. The actual tasks were organized in runs of
six trials. Before each run, the upcoming task (imitation,
complementary action, or color task-run) was introduced on
the screen by a cue. This task cue stayed on the screen as
long as the participants needed to actively prepare the
upcoming task run. Accordingly, the participants were
explicitly instructed to use the cue presentation interval to
prepare for the upcoming task run.
Apparatus and procedure
The experiment consisted of a single session with one par-
ticipant at a time. The participant was seated at a table fac-
ing a cathode ray tube computer screen (19 in. eVective
screen) at a distance of approximately 100 cm. To serve as
a starting point, a response box was placed on the table
directly in front of the participant and aligned with the par-
ticipant’s midline. Between the response box and the com-
puter screen, at a distance of 55 cm from the participant, a
touch-sensitive manipulandum was Wxed to the table (see
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Fig. 1). The manipulandum was custom-made to detect
grasping actions of the participant either at the cylinder
base (r = 3.0 cm; height = 8.0 cm) or at the top (r = 0.8 cm;
height = 1.8 cm). A PC running Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral systems Inc., Albany, CA) was used to
detect release of the response box (reaction time, RT) and
grasping of the object (movement time, MT and grip selec-
tion) at millisecond resolution.
Written and verbal instructions were given explaining
the tasks and explicitly asking the participant to only initi-
ate their action when being sure which action to perform
and to avoid switching between grasps on the Xy. This
instruction was given to avoid the possibility that partici-
pants postponed their decision to the end of the grasping
movement, making sure that RTs provided a true measure
of response selection. Before the actual experiment, each
participant practiced the tasks and was trained not to post-
pone the decision. Each trial began with the participants
pressing the start button with their index Wnger and the pre-
sentation of an image showing the co-actor in a non-active
posture (se Fig. 1). After 1 s, the image was displaced by a
second image (imperative stimulus) showing the co-actor
grasping the manipulandum at the top (precision grip) or at
the bottom (full grip). Consecutive presentation of the two
images generated apparent motion of the co-actor’s hand
moving toward the manipulandum in the image. After mak-
ing the decision, the participant released the start button,
executed the required action by grasping the manipulandum
with a precision or full grip, and returned to press the start
button for the next trial. RTs were measured relative to the
onset of the imperative stimulus, which remained on the
screen until the end of the trial. Grasping errors were
registered as well as early releases when the start button
was released before the onset of the imperative stimulus.
The experiment included eight experimental blocks sep-
arated by breaks and consisting of 96 trials each. Imitation
and complementary action tasks were separated during the
experiment. This was done in such a way that, for half of all
participants, the Wrst four blocks included imitation and
color runs (imitation blocks), while the last four blocks
included complementary action and color runs (comple-
mentary action blocks). The other half of the participants
followed the reversed order of imitation and complemen-
tary action blocks. Within an imitation block, participants
alternated between eight imitation task-runs and eight color
task-runs (test runs), always starting with an imitation task-
run. So, within an imitation block, participants executed a
total of 16 task runs, consisting of six trials each. The same
structure was implemented within complementary action
blocks. In this way, the experiment consisted of 32
imitation runs (i.e., four imitation blocks x eight imitation
task-runs), 32 complementary action runs (i.e., four com-
plementary action blocks £ eight complementary action
task-runs), and 64 (color) test runs (each of the eight exper-
imental blocks included eight test runs). Half of all trials
required a precision grip and the other half a full grip. Both
the imitation condition and the complementary action con-
dition were preceded by a practice block of 96 trials.
Data analysis
Trials with errors of grip and trials with RTs or MTs more
than 2.5 SD from the participant’s mean were excluded
from statistical analysis. RTs and MTs were analyzed with
Fig. 1 Experimental stimuli and time course used in the study. Stimuli
were images depicting the co-actor in a non-active posture (a) followed
by a second image (imperative stimulus) showing the co-actor grasp-
ing the manipulandum, using either a full grip (b) or a precision grip
(c). In test trials, the manipulandum was colored green or purple (c).
The participants pressed the start button (1) to initiate a trial. After
selecting the movement as the response to the second image, the par-
ticipants released the start button, gripped the manipulandum using the
appropriate grip (2), and returned to the initial position pressing the
start button for the next trial (3)
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separate statistical designs using repeated measures
ANOVA. For normal (non-colored) trials, a one-way
repeated measures ANOVA with the factor Action context
(imitation vs. complementary action) was conducted,
whereas for (color) test trials a 2 £ 2 repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted, with the factors Action context
(imitation vs. complementary action) and Congruency
(same action vs. opposite action). Finally, we compared the
test trial data of the present study with the data from Exper-
iment 2 of van Schie et al. (2008) in which color trials were
presented intermixed with imitation and complementary
actions trials instead of separated in task runs. Here, we
focused on possible diVerences in (reversal of) congruency
eVects between the two studies, with Study (current vs. van
Schie et al.) as the between factor. An alpha level of 0.05
was used for all statistical tests in this study.
Results
On average, participants made a small percentage of errors
(0.94%) in grip selection. Furthermore, 4.2% of the correct
trials were not included in the analysis due to the 2.5 SD
exclusion criterion applied to RTs and MTs.
The ANOVA applied to RTs to normal trials showed a
main eVect of action context, F (1, 19) = 5.43, p < 0.05,
reXecting faster RTs for imitative than for complementary
actions (see Fig. 2). For test trials, no signiWcant main eVect
of action context was observed, F < 1. The ANOVA
yielded a main eVect of congruency only, F (1, 19) = 21.55,
p < 0.001, indicating faster RTs for same (464 ms) than for
opposite actions (476 ms). Critically, no signiWcant interac-
tion between action context and congruency was observed,
F (1, 19) = 2.25, p = 0.15. This indicates that, when
responding to color, participants executed the task faster
when the required action of the participant matched the
action of the virtual actor (relative to the condition when
the executed action diVered from the observed action) inde-
pendently of the action context (see Fig. 2). The ANOVA
applied to MTs showed no signiWcant main eVects or inter-
actions.
To control for the possibility that the training eVects on
test trials were not detected due to spreading the analysis
over all trials of a task run, we conducted the same analy-
sis of RTs focusing on Wrst trials only. This analysis
showed that the main eVect of action context in normal
trials was not signiWcant, F (1, 19) = 1.12, p = 0.30. For
test trials, the analysis yielded a similar but smaller main
eVect of congruency as observed in the previous analysis
that involved all trials that almost reached signiWcance, F
(1, 19) = 3.75, p = 0.068. This marginally insigniWcant
congruency eVect implies that also in Wrst trials, partici-
pants tended to respond faster (515 ms) when the required
action matched the observed action of the virtual co-actor
than when the two actions did not match (523 ms). Impor-
tantly, also this analysis yielded no signiWcant interaction
between action context and congruency (F < 1, see
Fig. 2), conWrming the observation of similar congruency
eVect for both action contexts in previous analysis of all
test trials.
Studies comparison
The ANOVA applied to RTs to test trials showed a main
eVect of study, F (1, 34) = 11.48, p < 0.005, reXecting gen-
erally faster RTs in the present study (470 ms) than in
Experiment 2 (576 ms) of the study by van Schie et al.
(2008). Importantly, a signiWcant three-way interaction
between action context, congruency, and study was
observed, F (1, 34) = 66.34, p < 0.001. This indicates that,
while in our study no reversal of congruency eVects
occurred, the data of Experiment 2 (van Schie et al.) dem-
onstrate a signiWcant reversal of congruency eVects (see
Fig. 2 for comparison).
Fig. 2 Means of average response time as a function of task (imitation
and complementary action) for normal trials (dotted lines) and color
test trials (solid lines). The data presented here are (a) from the study
conducted by van Schie et al. (2008, Experiment 2) and our study
(b, c) depicting the data for all trials and Wrst trials, respectively. The
test trials included predeWned actions (either a precision grip or a full
grip) independently of the action of the virtual actor. In this way, the
action executed by the participant could either be the same as (Wlled
squares) or opposite from (unWlled squares) the action of the virtual
actor
Psychological Research (2009) 73:578–586 583
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Discussion
The present study focused on two possible theoretical
explanations for the Wnding that action observation facili-
tates activation of complementary actions in cooperative
settings (e.g., van Schie et al., 2008). SpeciWcally, we
investigated whether the reported reversal of congruency
eVects could better be explained as an eVect of associative
learning or as an eVect of (interfering) task representations.
To this end, we conducted an experiment, in which we min-
imized the possibility for task interference to exert an eVect,
while leaving room for associative learning mechanisms to
reverse congruency eVects between imitation and comple-
mentary action conditions.
Importantly, the experiment showed no reversal of con-
gruency eVects. Instead, a consistent eVect of congruency
was found over conditions, reXecting faster RTs to congru-
ent as compared to incongruent movements irrespective of
the context in which test runs were presented. An additional
analysis focusing on the Wrst trials of the test runs con-
Wrmed that perception-action associations built up during
task runs did not diVerentially aVect and transfer to test
runs. Additional analysis comparing the data of the present
study with the data of Experiment 2 of the study conducted
by van Schie et al. (2008) conWrmed the absence of the
reversed congruency eVects in our study. It thus seems that
the faster responses to incongruent stimuli as reported in
the study of van Schie et al. critically depend on the inter-
mixing of task and test trials, and that these eVects do not
reXect the low level associations that may have been built
up between stimuli and responses during task performance.
Thus, the present results provide further support for the the-
oretical notion that task representations may temporarily
overrule existing long-term S–R associations in accordance
with task requirements and that this Xexibility in action–
perception coupling cannot adequately be explained in
terms of associative learning eVects.
Action accounts based on associative learning deWne
actions as response to stimulation. Which response will be
given to a certain stimulus depends on the strongest associ-
ation the stimulus has developed through experience. Like-
wise, the ASL account (Heyes, 2001) suggests that actions
are selected based on the strongest S–R association. Also
any kind of Xexibility in action selection occurs according
to the ASL account purely through S–R associations. Spe-
ciWcally, the idea is that people can learn new associations
(within the same or a new context), which are then active
next to the already existing ones. Through extensive train-
ing the newly formed S–R associations get stronger and can
therefore overcome old associations and get selected within
the same action context. When acquired within a new con-
text, the selection of a speciWc response is then determined
by contextual cues. Such an account can explain many
phenomena reported in the imitation literature, like auto-
matic imitation (e.g., Press, Bird, Walsh, & Heyes, 2008),
spatial compatibility (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz 2001b), as
well as abolishment (Heyes et al., 2005) and reversal (e.g.,
Catmur et al., 2007) of automatic imitation through prac-
tice. The challenge for the ASL account (as well as the
other action models based on associative learning) arises
when about the same amount of extensive incompatible
training in some conditions does (van Schie et al., 2008)
and in other conditions does not (our study) show the rever-
sal of congruency eVects. We suggest that the reversal of
congruency eVects as reported by van Schie el al. is due to
task-representation eVects governing the action–perception
coupling in situations of more dynamic task requirements.
A long literature on cognitive control has shown that
optimal task execution in a dynamic environment depends
on an eYcient interaction between maintaining the current
goal and protecting it from distractions on the one hand and
a change of focus, if required, on the other. Flexible cogni-
tion is certainly of high importance in many real-life situa-
tions that require context-speciWc goal-directed behavior. It
is interesting to note here that, although the evidence for
Xexible cognition is well established in cognitive psychol-
ogy (e.g., cognitive control literature), the research Weld of
imitation and action observation has not really imple-
mented this knowledge so far. Research on task switching,
for instance, has shown that people are able to implement
diVerent task rules to the same stimulus set and to rapidly
switch between the rules when required. In these settings,
task history seems to play an important role. Previous acti-
vation of a particular task representation may facilitate the
execution of a similar task or impede the execution of a
competing task in paradigms involving dynamic task
switching. In other words, previous activation of a task rep-
resentation may persist and inXuence the execution of
future tasks (c.f. Altmann & Gray, 2008).
The eYciency with which individuals may shield the
task performance from previous task requirements likely
depends on the temporal separation or overlap between
tasks in time. In particular the requirement to maintain
access to the mental representation of an ongoing task (i.e.,
task code) in episodic memory (Altmann & Gray, 2008)
may make an individual particularly sensitive to the presen-
tation of stimulus features that are associated with speciWc
responses via the task code. Although the functional role of
task representations, according to Dreisbach and Haider
(2009), is to shield the system from processing task-irrele-
vant information, this will only Wlter out information that is
irrelevant to task, while allowing task related stimulus fea-
tures to activate their response codes. In the study of van
Schie et al. (2008), the requirement to maintain a concur-
rent task representation probably allowed the task-irrele-
vant stimulus features of test stimuli (i.e., action postures)
584 Psychological Research (2009) 73:578–586
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to activate their response codes and directly interfere with
participants’ responses to the task-relevant stimulus feature
(i.e., color). Although in the present study participants still
frequently switched between the primary (respond to
posture) task and secondary (respond to color) task, the
occurrence of both tasks was highly predictable and fur-
thermore cued in advance to maximize cognitive separation
and minimize temporal overlap. Since the current design
did not require participants to maintain diVerent task repre-
sentations activated concurrently, current task execution
was less aVected by interference arising from other task
representations.
Furthermore, as a consequence of predictable task occur-
rence, participants probably better prepared the tasks in the
present study. This might explain why task execution was
generally faster in our study than in the study by van Schie
et al. (2008). Koch (2005) has shown that task predictabil-
ity can be used for eVective task preparation (see also Pol-
jac, Koch, & Bekkering, 2009) which may in turn further
help task shielding by directing attention toward task rele-
vant information while ignoring task-irrelevant informa-
tion.
We should note that the explanation we propose for the
reversal of congruency eVects in terms of task-representa-
tion eVects would certainly need further empirical testing.
Our study provides direct evidence that the reversal of con-
gruency eVects cannot suYciently be explained in terms of
associative learning, but the evidence for the eVects of task
representations stays indirect. Our idea of overlapping task
representations inXuencing the way that action–perception
coupling takes place is in line with the ideas of shared rep-
resentations proposed in the literature so far. It has been
suggested that these shared (action) representations allow
us to understand the actions, goals, and intentions of others
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001). The nature of the shared represen-
tations has been suggested in terms of perceptual and motor
events coded as a shared set of features (Hommel, Müss-
eler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). This theory of event
coding (TEC; see also Hommel, 2009) proposes that the
salience of particular features depends on task, context, and
the direction of attention. According to TEC, this feature
weighting can be inXuenced by both intentional (response
related) and attentional (stimulus related) inXuences.
Related to our study, an important and interesting question
to address would be at which level overlapping task repre-
sentations would aVect action selection and execution. It is
possible that overlap in task representations on the level of
stimulus and/or response sets generates priming of tasks as
already reported in the task-switching literature (e.g., Koch
& Allport, 2006). On the other hand, the imitation literature
provides evidence for the idea that task representations
would (also) inXuence action selection on the level of
action goals (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis,
2000). Consistent with this to suggestion, Longo, Kosobud,
and Bertenthal (2008) just recently reported that the default
level of common coding in action imitation occurred at the
level of action goals. Interestingly, the authors also showed
that automatic imitation is modulated by top-down inXu-
ences. They demonstrated that the level of action coding
could be changed (e.g., toward coding on the level of
movements) depending on task requirements. This again
suggests more Xexibility in action–perception coupling
than commonly believed in the literature and supports our
idea of task representations playing a major role in action–
perception coupling in dynamic task conditions. Especially
for cooperative settings, we would expect that the eVects of
task representations take place on the goal level, since
dynamic interactions between individuals mostly involve
execution of complementary actions with the aim to suc-
cessfully accomplish a joint goal.
Another important Wnding in our study concerns the
observed congruency eVects.1 We found that the partici-
pants were generally faster in responding to color when
action execution corresponded to the observed action, inde-
pendently of the action context. This Wnding seems to sup-
port the idea that action observation automatically yields
imitation in the observer (e.g., Fadiga et al., 2005). We
think that action–perception coupling follows the automatic
and direct processing in some conditions. Moreover, we
think that the cognitive system allows for both automatic
and Xexible action–perception coupling. Consistent with
our view, Erlhagen et al. (2006) have recently proposed a
model that seems to implement both the direct (automatic)
and the Xexible action–perception coupling. The model was
developed for learning by imitation in robots based on
diVerent behavioral and neuroimaging Wndings reported in
the animal and human imitation literature. Their model
involves four interconnected brain areas, namely the supe-
rior temporal sulcus (STS), area PF, area F5, and the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC). Based on the animal literature, the
STS-PF-F5 connection is believed to represent the neural
basis for a matching between the visual description of an
action in area STS and its motor representation in area F5.
This connection allows for the direct and automatic imita-
tion of the observed action. Importantly, however, the
1 The two action tasks we used in test trials (i.e., precision and full grip)
diVered also in their movement direction. Recently, Brass et al.
(2001b) reported that S–R spatial compatibility related to movement
direction also contributes to imitation facilitation. It is thus possible
that this spatial component of our tasks (i.e., grasping the upper or the
lower part of the manipulandum, respectively) inXuenced the congru-
ency eVects observed in the present study. Van Schie et al. (2008),
however, demonstrated that the spatial compatibility of the task we
used in our study aVected general task execution in such a way that it
facilitated tasks within the imitation context relative to the comple-
mentary context. They showed that the (reversal of the) congruency
eVect was independent of the spatial component present in this task.
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model allows also for the Xexible action–perception cou-
pling through the reciprocal connections between PF and
PFC. These connections make it possible to dominate the
direct matching between STS and F5 if necessary. In this
way, the model nicely implements two important physio-
logical Wndings reported in the imitation literature and
allows the plasticity of the system. Namely, the STS-PF-F5
route is consistent with the operation of the (primate and
human) mirror neuron system (MNS) underlying the per-
formance of both imitative (see e.g., Rizzolatti et al., 2001)
and complementary actions (e.g., Newman-Norlund et al.
2007). Neuroimaging studies suggest that human MNS
involves STS, the inferior parietal lobe (matching the ani-
mal PF), and inferior frontal gyrus (matching the animal
area F5; see e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Around
one-third of mirror neurons seem to match directly the
exact motor (i.e., eVector and movement speciWc) proper-
ties of observed actions, while the remaining two-thirds are
linked mainly to the goal of the action and reveal a much
broader matching between action observation and execu-
tion (i.e., involving diVerent eVectors and/or diVerent pos-
tures), which in principle could support incongruent action–
perception mappings in joint action. Most importantly, the
Xexible action–perception coupling is realized in the model
by the connection between the PF area and the PFC through
which goal representations from PFC can modulate and set
the coupling between visual (STS) and motor (F5) repre-
sentations if required.
An important issue to address here considers the predic-
tion of conditions in which the cognitive system might use
one of the two action–perception routes. We would suggest
that as long as task requirements are clearly deWned and
predictable (as in our study), task goals could easily be
accomplished through the direct action–perception cou-
pling. Dynamic environments, however, in which success-
ful task execution depends on an eYcient interaction
between the activation of the current and (possibly diVer-
ent) future action goals (as in the study of van Schie et al.,
2008) would probably require more controlled action–per-
ception coupling. Our daily-life interactions with others
would most probably need to use the connections between
PF and PFC, which allow us to Xexibly adapt action selec-
tion when needed.
In conclusion, our data argue for models allowing Xexi-
ble action–perception coupling through dynamic imple-
mentation of task representations governing goal-directed
actions in cooperative settings rather than (only) through
associative learning.
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